China has accelerated and deepened bank reform since it joined the WTO in 2001. Employing a stochastic distance function, this paper investigates the technical efficiency of banks and examines the static, selection and dynamic effects of governance changes on bank efficiency in China for the period 1995-2005. Our results show that bank efficiency has been improved and state-owned banks still perform poorly except for a noticeable improvement from 2003. Strong selection effects are found from both the foreign acquisition and going-public reform strategies. Foreign acquisition may benefit bank efficiency in the long run, but going-public appears to have just some short run effects. One obvious policy implication is that foreign competition is beneficial to China's on-going bank reform, and goingpublic is just a means to allow effective foreign competition.
Introduction
The Chinese banking system has experienced fundamental structural changes and reforms along with China's comprehensive economic reform since 1978. The aim is to transform the sector from a state-owned, monopolistic and policy-driven to a multi-ownership, competitive and profit-oriented system. However, the pace of bank reform has lagged far behind the reform in the real economic sectors. With Recent reforms have focused on ownership shift of state-owned banks in the hope of enhancing corporate governance to improve efficiency. Foreign acquisition and IPO are two major strategies of reforming state-owned banks. The underpinning economic theories are the principal-agent problem and soft budgetary constraints. Both are possible sources of inefficiency because that agent (management) may not act on the best interests of the principal (the owner) and a soft budget constraint gives rise to a moral hazard problem.
These strategies are expected to change banks' corporate governance and result in a hard budget, helping to resolve the agency and moral hazard problems. These reform measures are also grounded on the mounting empirical findings in which state-ownership is generally found less efficient. This paper develops a comprehensive model to investigate bank efficiency and the impact of governance changes by combining the advantages of existing models, procedures and methods. It adopts a stochastic frontier approach (SFA) that separates the error term into a random error ( ) and inefficiency ( ), resulting in more accurate technical efficiency estimates. It employs a distance function, allowing for the estimation of a multiple inputs and multiple outputs production technology without input price information and behavioural assumptions. Moreover, it uses a single-step procedure to overcome serious econometric problems suffered by a two-step procedure. In addition, the model incorporates Berger et al. (2005) method into the technical inefficiency effects model to jointly examine the static, selection, and dynamic effects of corporate governance changes. been improved in China. The average efficiency level is about 70%, which is moderate compared with that of the US or European banks. Corporate governance and risk taking characteristics are found to have a significant impact on bank efficiency. State-owned banks, on average, still performed poorly although there have been significant improvement in the last three years (static effect). Strong selection effects are found for both foreign acquisition and initial public offering (IPO). The benefits of foreign acquisition may be realised for a longer term. The going-public strategy is found to benefit in the short term but the efficiency gains are unsustainable in the long term. These results have important policy implications. Moreover, different model specifications shed important light on methodological issues of efficiency study, that is, income-based model is proved to be superior to earning assets-based model, at least from our data.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the Chinese banking industry and reviews literature on bank efficiency. Section 3 describes methodologies, including a one-2 step procedure of stochastic frontier estimation and an output distance function approach.
Section 4 specifies empirical models and describes data. Section 5 analyses empirical results. Section 6 draws conclusions with policy implications.
Chinese banking system and efficiency literature

The Chinese banking system
Prior to economic reforms in 1978, the Chinese banking industry was entirely dominated by the People's Bank of China (PBC). The reform process can be divided into four periods:
initial institutional restructuring (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) ; establishing four big state-owned commercial banks (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) ; reforming these state banks (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) ; ownership reform and foreign competition from 2003 onwards (Tang, 2005) . During 1979-1984, PBC was broken up into two arms: the central bank retaining the name of PBC, and commercial operations comprising of four specialized state-owned banks, namely, Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), CCB, ICBC, and BOC. During 1984-1994 , institutional restructuring was deepened.
A two-tier system was created, dominated by these state banks, along with some newly established joint-equity commercial banks. Their operations were subject to frequent intervention of central and local governments to extend loans to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), resulting in mounting non-performing loans (NPLs).
The period 1994-2003 was characterised with the commercialization of the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs). The policy lending function of SOCBs was taken away by three newly created state-owned policy banks, although they were still requested to play a significant role in policy lending. In helping SOCBs create a sound capital structure, the government injected RMB 270 billion through issuing long-term treasure bonds and offloaded RMB 1.4 trillion NPLs via four newly established State Assets Management Companies. A series of concrete and comprehensive reforms were initiated to transform the policy-driven banking system to a market-oriented one, such as removal of credit quotas in 1998, introduction of capital adequacy requirement and the application of an internationally accepted five-classification standard scheme. Moreover, 112 city commercial banks (CCBs) were created through restructuring and consolidating the former urban credit cooperatives (Wong and Wong, 2001 ).
Since 2003, bank reform has been accelerated and deepened to bring the SOCBs into modern financial enterprises through two new major strategies: foreign acquisition and IPO.
The government commenced the second round of financial restructuring and injected $45 billion to BOC and CCB in 2003 and $15 billion to ICBC in 2005, utilizing its excessive foreign exchange reserves. They were restructured as modern financial enterprises with a better corporate governance structure and subsequently underwent IPO so as to subject their operations to market discipline (Tang, 2005) .
Meanwhile, foreign equity participation in domestic banks has been encouraged, motivated by the much-needed capital and the urgency of importing superior management and In the same year, Goldman Sachs, Allianz and American Express signed MOU with ICBC, agreeing to acquire a 10% stake (source from various press releases). By acquiring equity stakes in domestic banks, foreign investors not only avoid suffering from low efficiency claimed for foreign banks in some cases but also reduce substantial costs of establishing a branch network to serve their customers.
China has made remarkable progress in bank reforms, with far-reaching economic implications. ICBC, CCB and BOC have emerged to be among the big banks in the world. The success of bank reform depends heavily on whether banks can really refrain from government intervention. Government intervention in lending decision still persists although less explicitly. It is also uncertain whether this implicit intervention could be reversed in the near future. As discussed in Dobson and Kashyap (2006) , the 11th Five-Year Plan has addressed the growing rural-urban and regional inequality and projects to balance urban-rural development through urbanization. Therefore, more employment is needed to absorb surplus rural labour and SOCBs are more likely to assist in achieving the overall goals and to provide necessary finance. This role is in conflict with the commercial banks' economic objectives of profitability and efficiency. The implication is that government influence might remain and that the reform of transforming SOCBs to truly commercial banks might take longer.
Bank efficiency in transition economies and developing counties
A wealth of literature on bank efficiency has been well established, but mainly in the US and European countries 1 . During the last decade, more attention has been paid to bank efficiency of developing countries and transition economies. In the literature, state-owned banks are notorious for being more inefficient over other types of banks for a number of reasons. State-owned banks generally functioned as government agents to fulfil national development plan and may pursue non-economic goals such as maintaining social stability and safeguarding employment. Other reasons include a severe free-rider problem that all citizens are theoretic co-owners who are unable to influence the management of state-banks and the lack of discipline for managers of inefficient banks (Huibers, 2005) .
Consequently, state ownership is considered to be a source of inefficiency and many governments attempt to privatize state-owned banks as an ultimate way of improving bank performance. Most studies find improved bank performance after privatization and financial liberalization (Williams and Nguyen, 2005; Megginson and Metter, 2002; Gilbert and Wilson, 1998) , while some others argue that the positive effect may be temporal and unsustainable in the long run (Hao et al., 2001; Katib and Mathews, 2000) .
Foreign acquisition and initial public offering (IPO) are two commonly used methods of privatization. Empirical literature generally concludes that foreign acquisition is associated with greater improvements in post-privatization performance than is purely domestically privatization (Fries and Taci. 2005; Bonin et al., 2005a , 2005b and Hasan and Marton, 1 Berger and Humphrey (1997 provide a valuable survey on financial institutions efficiency studies.
2003)
. IPO is considered as an effective method of privatization than others by minimizing suboptimal behaviour and eliminating inefficiencies. Going public not only facilitates the adoption of market-oriented disciplines but also improves banks' corporate governance.
IPO, as the divestment mechanism of state ownership, has been proved to be a productive strategy for privatizing banks in Poland (Huibers, 2005) .
The relationship between performance and corporate governance is often considered under the economic theory of principal-agent problem which arises whenever the management of an entity is separated from its owner. This problem is compounded for state-owned banks because the role of owner-the state is ambiguous, being both the regulator and owner.
Governance issue in banking industry is even more complicated because of its speciality, including strengths of bank regulation and supervision, the opaqueness of bank assets, the level of markets development, and institutional environment (Levine, 2004) . Appropriate governance structure is the one that eliminates inefficiency caused by principal-agent problems. Berger et al. (2005) carry out an outstanding study examining the relationship between governance changes and bank efficiency by proposing a method that accounts for the static, selection and dynamic effects of governance changes simultaneously in one model.
While the literature on bank efficiency in transition and developing countries has been welldeveloped during the last decade, only a handful of studies examine the efficiency of the Chinese banking sector. Using SFA, Yao et al. (2007) , Fu and Heffernan (2005), and Berger et al. (2006) examine the relationship between ownership and bank efficiency and consistently report improved efficiency level and state-owned banks being the least efficient. Employing DEA, Chen et al. (2005) examine the effect of deregulation and find state-owned banks outperform other banks, whereas Hu et al. (2006) and Wang et al. (2005) come up with an opposite story that joint-stock commercial banks are more efficient than state-owned banks. These studies focus on the static effects of different governance structures on efficiency. This paper advances the existing literature by examining the effects of various ongoing reform measures and risk-taking characteristics on bank efficiency over the 1995-2005 for all types of commercial banks in China. To our best knowledge, it is the first study adopting an output distance function to estimate bank efficiency by jointly examining the static, selection and dynamic effects of governance changes, particularly foreign acquisition and IPO, on bank performance in China.
Methodologies
One-stage SFA model
A stochastic frontier approach (SFA), independently developed by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) , pre-specifies a functional form for estimation and decomposes the error term into random error ( ) and inefficiency ( ).
SFA has been criticized for using a predetermined frontier functional form and pre-assumed distribution of the random error and inefficiency. However, the separation of a random error from inefficiency improves the accuracy of estimated technical efficiency. Efficiency studies employing SFA frequently adopt a two-stage estimation procedure. The first stage specifies and estimates a stochastic frontier to estimate inefficiencies for individual firms, assuming these inefficiencies are distributed identically. The second stage regresses these predicted inefficiencies on a set of firm specific characteristics attempting to explain differences in estimated efficiency. This two-stage procedure suffers from serious econometric problems, due to its contradictory assumptions on the independence of the inefficiency effects in the two stages (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000) .
The awareness of the contradiction has promoted the development of the single-stage approach in which the potential relationship between the firm specific variables and technical efficiency is imposed in a single-stage procedure to estimate the production technology and firm efficiencies (Kumbhakar et al., 1991; Reifschneider and Stevenson, 1991; Huang and Liu, 1994; and Battese and Coelli, 1995) . With extensive Monte Carlo evidence, Wang and Schmidt (2002) strongly recommend the one-stage models.
This study adopts a one-step model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995) . It assumes that non-negative technical inefficiencies are a function of firm-specific and environmental variables, and independently distributed as truncations of normal distribution with a constant variance, but with means that are a linear function of observable variables. The model is a more generalized model than other one-step model by encompassing other efficiency estimation models as special cases.
Output distance function
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The distance function approach is a recently developed technique in efficiency study and it has been increasingly applied to efficiency study with the recognition of its potential advantages. A distance function approach has a number of prominent virtues (Cuesta and Orea, 2002; Coelli and Perelman, 2000; Fare et al., 1993; and Grosskopf et al., 1995) . A major advantage is that a distance function represents multiple-outputs and multi-inputs production technology, which facilitates efficiency study for industries employing such technology without input price information and behavioural assumption. When price information is unavailable or inaccurately measured and/or when behaviour assumptions of cost-minimization or profit-maximization are inappropriate or unrealistic, traditional dual approach to accounting for multi-outputs production technology, such as cost and profit functions, are inapplicable. In this regard, a distance function approach can be used as an applicable alternative to the dual approach for the multi-outputs production technology.
A distance function can be defined in terms of radial input conservation or output 
It is assumed that the technology satisfies the standard axioms, such as convexity, weak disposability, as listed in Fare and Primont (1995) .
The output distance function is first introduced by Shephard in 1970. Based on common definition of production technology that transforms inputs into outputs, the output distance function is defined in terms of the output set P(x), by equation (3).
where θ is the scalar 'distance' by which the output vector can be deflated.
The value of will be less than or equal to one if the output vector, y, is an element of the feasible production set of P(x).
A translog function is selected for empirical representation of the output distance function, which is given in equation (4) for I firms producing M outputs using K inputs,
where "O" indicates an output-oriented distance function and i denotes the ith firm in the sample.
An output distance function must satisfy certain regularity restrictions, including homogeneity of degree one in outputs
, and , and
Following Lovell et al (1994) , homogeneity constraint can be imposed by normalizing the output distance function by one of the outputs. The homogeneity property implies that
for any 0 > ω and it can be satisfied by output normalizations using an arbitrary output in the empirical practice. If the Mth output is chosen for normalization and ω is set at , then we have
In particular, equation (4) becomes: 
For the estimation purpose, the left hand side of equation (6) is transformed to be rather than and it becomes a standard SFA model. Coelli and Perelman (1996) argue that the normalization procedure for imposing homogeneity of degree one in outputs by one of the outputs results in the fact that the output ratios appear in the model rather than output variables. These output ratios may be assumed to be exogenous since the output distance function is defined for radial expansion of all outputs, given the input levels. The commonly used intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977 ) is adopted, which views banks as using labour, physical capital, and funds to produce earning assets. The treatment of deposits has long been a controversial issue. This paper adopts a dual approach that treats the stock value of deposits as an output while treats the costs of deposits as input like in Bauer et al. (1993) , Humphrey and Pulley (1997) and Chen et al. (2005) .
Empirical studies show that efficiency estimates can be sensitive to the specification of inputs and outputs and therefore this paper specifies three different combinations of inputs and outputs. Particularly, Model 1 is income-based specification which defines two inputs: total interest expense ( ) and non-interest expense ( ), and two outputs: net interest income ( ) and non-interest income ( ) (Sturm and Williams, 2004; Park and Weber, 2006) . Models 2 and 3 are earning assets-based specification. Model 2 specifies two inputs, total interest expense ( ) and labour and physical capital ( ), and three outputs, total loans ( ), total deposits ( ) and non-interest income ( ) (Rogers, 1998; Park and Weber, 2006) . Non-interest income is defined as an additional output to capture the effect of increasingly important diversification of bank activities. Model 3 specifies three inputs, total interest expense ( ), physical capital ( ), and labour ( ), and three outputs, total loans ( ), total deposit ( ) and other earning assets ( ). Equation (7) x are inputs and t is a time trend. Notes: (1) ROA = return on assets; LLR = loan loss reserve; Cost efficiency = overhead over total assets. Loans, other earning assets, deposits and total assets are presented in RMB billion. All types of banks with no governance change are less profitable on average, except for
CCBs. This may be the reflection that better performing banks have been picked up for governance changes or banks have performed better after governance changes, or both.
CCBs and JECBs with no governance changes are more cost efficient than their group average, implying that governance changes generally involve excessive costs at least in the short run but its downside effects have been offset fully by improved profitability.
SOCBs with no governance changes are shown to be less profitable and less cost efficient than the group average. Governance changes in SOCBs not only have improved profitability but also cost efficiency.
The inefficiency effects model of one-step Battese and Coelli (1995) 
Risk
Risk taking characteristics are represented by a set of financial ratios. In particular, E/A ratio controls for capital risk, loan loss reserve to total loans ratio for credit risk, interbank borrowing to total deposits ratio for market risk, and total loans to total deposits ratio for liquidity risk.
E/A ratio presents capital risk and the higher the E/A ratio, the lower the capital risk. It should be analyzed in conjunction with the budget constraints argument. Credit risk indicator, LLR/Total Loans ratio, measures how much banks provide for unanticipated losses from loan default. It reflects banks' financial strength since loan loss reserve is used as a cushion against possible future loan defaults. Banks with higher LLR/Total
Loans ratio are exposed to lower level of credit risk, and thus are expected to be more efficient. The ratio of interbank borrowing to total deposit for each bank measures the extent to which a bank specialises in wholesale rather than retail operations. GDP growth is included as a proxy for general macroeconomic environment in which banks 15 operate. A time trend variable is also included to capture common effect on efficiency,
i.e. technical change and policy change.
A set of governance changes indicators is used to capture the effect of intensified contemporary banking reform in China. Berger et al. (2005) 
The selection indicators, Selected for Foreign Acquisition and Selected for Going
Public, represent banks being selected for foreign acquisitions or IPO. Dummies equal 1 for all periods for such a bank and 0 for all other banks. In the case of banks experiencing both foreign acquisition and going public, both are accounted separately.
As shown in 
Empirical results
Results of stochastic frontier model
Maximum-likelihood (ML) estimates of parameters are reported in Table 3 Following Fare and Primont (1995) and Coelli and Perelman (1999) , the scale elasticity is given by . The negative sum of the firstorder input coefficients in the output distance function estimation indicates the return to scale in the production process. The scale elasticities are less than one in all three models, suggesting decreasing return to scale at the mean of the Chinese banking industry. The average estimated technical efficiencies of different bank groups are plotted in Figure 2a for income-based Model 1 and Figure 2b for earning assets-based Model 2.
For both models, CCBs are the least efficient domestic banks except for the first four years. This is because only a small number of high performing CCBs are included.
Strikingly, foreign banks are found to be less efficient than their domestic counterparts. 
Results of technical inefficiency effects model
It is an important part of efficiency study to predict the structure of production technology and to estimate efficiency scores for individual banks. However, the second 23 part of efficiency study is more important because it focuses on the determinants of efficiencies. The results from the inefficiency effects model of three different specifications are reported in In Model 1, a negative coefficient of the E/A ratio suggests that banks subject to hard budget constraints are more efficient. It confirms our hypothesis that a soft budget is a source of inefficiency because it causes a moral hazard problem. If banks are subject to a hard budget constraint, they have to raise capital from shareholders and hence they need to be more efficient to attract more capital. In earning assets-based models, E/A ratio is found to have a negative effect on efficiency. Results from different models are conflicting in the sense that banks subject to a soft budget constraint are less efficient in income generation but more efficient in earning assets. However, it provides further evidence that a soft budget constraint is associated with moral hazards, leading to a quick expansion in earning assets but low efficiency in income generation. Again, it provides evidence for the superiority of an income-based model over an earning assetsbased model, especially in a situation where assets quality is poor. 
LLR/Total Loans
Conclusion
This paper examines technical efficiency and the impact of corporate governance and risk-taking behaviour on bank performance in China during 1995-2005. The estimated average efficiency is 70%, suggesting a large potential for efficiency improvement.
After many years of reforms, SOCBs still dominate the banking industry and their efficiency levels are still low compared with JECBs despite significant improvement in the past three years.
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Our data provide adequate information for constructing a stochastic output distance function to examine the static, selection and dynamic effects of corporate governance changes and risk-taking behaviour on bank efficiency. JECBs are found to be the most efficient group, while foreign banks are the least efficient (static effects). The selection effect indicators provide an economic justification for the opening up policy.
Associated with a significant cherry-picking effect (selection effects), foreign participation in domestic banks can improve efficiency in the long run (dynamic effect).
A cherry-picking effect is also found in the Chinese banks which had undergone an IPO to gain more assets. Banks with IPO have realized efficiency gains in the short term, but such gains may not be sustained in the long run. This has serious policy implications on bank reform in China. What it implies is that IPO by its own virtue 28 does not necessarily result in efficiency gain. The underlying reasons need to be carefully investigated and this reform strategy should be re-considered more carefully with a focus on fundamental changes. Moreover, banks subject to a hard budget tend to be more prudential in risk taking and therefore more efficient than those subject to a soft budget, implying that there is scope for improving efficiency of the Big Four through a harder budgetary discipline, which has been conducted through IPO over the last two years for CCB, BOC and ICBC.
This paper has also contributed to the literature with methodological concerns. It has found that an income-based model is superior to an assets-earning model, especially when assets quality is poor. It has implications on the choice of models when studying bank efficiency, especially in countries like China. Our suggestion is that both models should be used since the investigation from different models could yield more valuable information in order to have an objective and accurate judgement on bank performance.
During the past few years, the Chinese government has speeded up bank reform by allowing foreign investment and SOCBs to be listed in the stock markets. The market reaction to the listing of CCB, BOC and ICBC has been surprisingly positive and the share prices of these banks are now much higher than their IPO prices. One critical question is whether the bullish market is driven by the fundamental changes in these banks, or by a positive expectation on China's economic growth, or by pure speculation.
The results in this paper show that IPO can have a short term positive effect but such an effect can fade in the long term. This implies that the future of SOCBs depends on their own ability to improve efficiency and profitability and IPO is at best the first step to improve such ability.
The success of bank reform also depends on whether banks can be essentially freed from government intervention. Government intervention in lending decision still persists but less explicitly. It is uncertain whether this implicit intervention could be reversed in the near future.
